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Evidentiary Incommensurability
A PRELIMINARY EXPLORATION OF THE PROBLEM
OF REASONING FROM GENERAL SCIENTIFIC DATA
TO INDIVIDUALIZED LEGAL DECISION-MAKING
David L. Faigman†
INTRODUCTION
Scientists typically study variables at the population
level, and most of their methodological and statistical tools are
designed for this kind of work. The trial process, in contrast,
ordinarily concerns whether a particular case is an instance of
the general phenomenon. As I have previously observed,
“[w]hile science attempts to discover the universals hiding
among the particulars, trial courts attempt to discover the
particulars hiding among the universals.”1 This essential
difference in perspective between what scientists normally do
and what the trial process is ordinarily about has yet to be
studied with any degree of rigor—by scientists or lawyers.2 Yet
†

John F. Digardi Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California,
Hastings College of the Law; Director, UCSF/UC Hastings Consortium on Law, Science
& Health Policy; Adjunct Professor, University of California San Francisco, School of
Medicine, Department of Psychiatry. The writing of this essay was supported by the
John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. The ideas developed here were the
basis for a proposal that I submitted as part of my participation in the MacArthur
Foundation’s Law and Neuroscience Project. I want to thank the members of that
Project for their valuable feedback on that proposal. In particular, Hank Greely, Owen
Jones, Stephen Morse, Marc Raichle, Adina Roskies, Jeff Schall, Walter SinnottArmstrong, and Susan Wolf were enormously helpful and generous in sharing their
ideas.
1
DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN
THE LAW 69 (1999).
2
One exception to this yawning silence is the work of Joseph Sanders, who
provides a careful examination of this issue in this volume. See generally Joseph
Sanders, Applying Daubert Inconsistently? Proof of Individual Causation in Toxic Tort
and Forensic Cases, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1367 (2010). In addition, the statistical
challenges associated with individualizing group data have been examined with
considerable sophistication in the context of predictions of violence. See, e.g., Stephen
D. Hart et al., Precision of Actuarial Risk Assessment Instruments: Evaluating the
‘Margins of Error’ of Group v. Individual Predictions of Violence, 190 BRIT. J.
PSYCHIATRY s60 (2007); Douglas Mossman, Analyzing the Performance of Risk
Assessment Instruments: A Response to Vrieze and Grove, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 279,
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this phenomenon is endemic to virtually every context in which
law and science meet. Indeed, it might be said to be the single
greatest obstacle to the law’s rational use of science.3
The challenges associated with individualizing science,
however, are not unique to the law. In fact, in a wide variety of
social contexts, empirical research exploring general
phenomena are sought to be applied reliably to individual
cases. In medicine, for example, research on the effectiveness of
various cancer therapies will inform a particular patient’s
decision regarding which therapy to choose. In meteorology,
research on hurricanes will inform a governor’s decision
regarding whether to evacuate a particular city. Indeed, all
applied science potentially presents the problem of making
decisions about discrete cases based on group data, ranging
from aerodynamics to zoology. Different fields have adapted
strategies to respond to the evidentiary incommensurability
challenge with differing degrees of success. In medical decisionmaking, for example, evidence-based medicine is one way that
doctors have sought to bring data to bear on individual
diagnostic and therapeutic judgments.4 Meteorologists generate
computer models that describe the likelihoods associated with
a storm’s path and strength.5 At least from an outsider’s

280 (2008); Scott I. Vrieze & William M. Grove, Predicting Sex Offender Recidivism, 32
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 266, 267 (2008). The problems of individualizing group data have
also caught the attention of neuroscientists. See, e.g., Michael B. Miller et al., Extensive
Individual Differences in Brain Activations Associated with Episodic Retrieval Are
Reliable over Time, 14 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 1200 (2002). On the issue more
generally, see John A. Swets, Robyn M. Dawes & John Monahan, Better Decisions
Through Science, 283 SCI. AM. 82 (2000). Ultimately, however, the question of
individualizing group data for courtroom use is not simply a problem of inferential
statistics. See David L. Faigman, The Limits of Science in the Courtroom, in BEYOND
COMMON SENSE: PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 303 (Eugene Borgida &
Susan T. Fiske eds., 2008).
3
Professor Margaret Berger, to whom this Festschrift and this essay are
dedicated, has devoted a substantial portion of her scholarship to navigating the
intersection of law and science. The basic incompatibility between much of what
science is able to offer and what most courts would like has been an abiding topic in
her extraordinary scholarship. See, e.g., Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General
Causation: Notes Towards a New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV.
2117, 2129-30 (1997); Margaret A. Berger & Lawrence M. Solan, The Uneasy
Relationship Between Science and Law: An Essay and Introduction, 73 BROOK. L. REV.
847, 852-53 (2008).
4
Daniel B. Mark, Decision-Making in Clinical Medicine, in 1 HARRISON’S
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 6, 6 (Dennis L. Kaspar et al. eds., 16th ed. 2005).
5
See, e.g., DAVID J. STENSRUD, PARAMETERIZATION SCHEMES: KEYS TO
UNDERSTANDING NUMERICAL WEATHER PREDICTION MODELS (2007).
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perspective, these efforts have not been so successful that
courts would want to borrow them wholesale.6
How, and whether, general data can be usefully
employed to inform decisions about individual events is a
problem that is central to the law’s function. In fact, courts are
generally acquainted with the difficulties inherent in
employing general scientific data to reach conclusions about
specific cases. The primary area in which courts have
considered this matter is in medical causation cases where they
distinguish routinely between “general causation” and “specific
causation.”7 Courts and legal scholars have not, however,
engaged in a careful study of the details and intricacies
associated with this matter across the wide spectrum of cases
in which it presents itself. In addition, although the courts are
passingly familiar with the problem of evidentiary
incommensurability, they naturally approach the subject from
their own need for information, with little appreciation for how
and whether scientists can produce this information. Courts
frequently demand empirical answers despite scientists’
inability to provide them.8 At the same time, scientists involved
in the legal process naturally approach the problem of
incommensurability from the perspective of their own desire to
produce information, with little appreciation for how and
whether the courts can effectively use this information.9 It is
6

For example, Dr. Jerome Groopman cautions against over-reliance on
evidence-based medicine, fearing that it “risks having the physician choose passively,
solely by the numbers,” rather than rely on the individual circumstances of each
patient. JEROME GROOPMAN, HOW DOCTORS THINK 5-6 (2007).
7
See DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., 3 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW
AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 21:6-:7, at 27-45 (2008-2009 ed.) (listing cases).
Not all science is engaged in describing cause and effect relationships, so “general
causation” and “specific causation” are subcategories of what might more properly be
labeled “general propositions” and “specific application.” Sometimes general
propositions in science will be stated in causative terms, but very often they will be
associational, technical, or descriptive. Specific application refers to the determination
whether a particular case is an instance, use, or example of general propositions that
are supported by research.
8
Among many possible examples that could be cited, possibly the most
obvious is that of predicting violence. Courts call upon experts in myriad contexts to
predict future behavior, from probation decisions to capital sentencing, though the best
empirical research indicates that such expert opinions remain highly fallible. See John
Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among Prisoners,
Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 405-07 (2006).
9
Scientists do not generally study how to “individualize” their findings in
ways that would make them most helpful for legal usage. This is not meant as a
criticism, only an observation. Especially in the social sciences, it is ordinarily
sufficient to find a statistically significant effect among college sophomores. Little
attention has been paid to how the variables studied might operate in a particular case.
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hardly surprising that scientists should study the questions
that they are most curious about and able to answer rather
than those the law deems most relevant. In short, therefore,
the two sides, law and science, perceive incommensurability
from their separate vantage points, which largely perpetuates
the problem.
This essay jumps into the center of this conundrum. My
objective, however, is somewhat unusual. It is a call to arms. I
do not aim to resolve the incommensurability paradox, but
rather to ring the fire-bell. Indeed, given the scope and depth of
the obstacles presented by evidentiary incommensurability, it
is a subject well beyond resolution in the pages provided to me
here. My purpose, then, is to explore the paradox in the hope
that it will help lay a common framework by which both
lawyers and scientists might understand the challenges
presented at the intersection of these two great professions.
This essay, therefore, contemplates many of the sundry issues
that would have to be reckoned with in any subsequent
comprehensive effort to bring systematic rationality to the
problem of employing group data to decide individual cases. It
is divided into two parts. Part I considers scientific hypothesis
testing and the inherent population focus of most of that work.
While most scientific research focuses on a general population
level analysis, results of that work can have very different
levels of probative value in regard to informing decisionmaking at the individual level. Part II examines evidentiary
demands in the courtroom and the inherent individualized
focus of that process. This part also considers some of the
challenges inherent in any attempt to close the evidentiary
incommensurability gap between what most science says and
what most legal proceedings need to know.
I.

HYPOTHESIS TESTING IN SCIENCE

Scientific research is most often conducted from a
general and population-based perspective. This is a defining
characteristic of the field. However, scientific methods, and the
phenomena that scientists study, range widely. Inevitably, the
demands of the empirical context dictate which set of research
designs are, or might be, available. While studying the effects
of depleted biodiversity in the Amazon rainforest and
investigating the interaction between neuron and glial cells in
a rat’s brain are both scientific endeavors, the methods
involved are obviously disparate. Yet, from the law’s
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perspective, there may be certain insights that persist across
scientific domains in regard to individualizing group data. This
section provides a preliminary sketch of the scientific
landscape regarding whether certain common denominators
might be identified within the process of bringing group data to
bear on individual decisions.
The essential question posed in the context of reasoning
from the group to the individual is whether a particular case is
an instance of the general phenomenon. If smoking causes lung
cancer, the individualized query is whether a particular
person’s lung cancer was caused by smoking. The degree to
which scientific research might be relevant to resolving an
individualized fact question varies from complete to not-at-all.
In some areas, science might provide a definitive answer to the
question of whether an individual case is an instance of a
general phenomenon. If tobacco smoke is the only cause of lung
cancer, we logically know that someone with lung cancer got
sick from tobacco smoke. In other areas, science might help
increase the accuracy of individual decision-making along a
range of helpfulness, from nearly determinative to just above
random chance. If tobacco smoke causes lung cancer, but many
other things, known and unknown, do so as well, we cannot say
with certainty that the person’s lung cancer was caused by
tobacco smoke. The degree of certainty that the science
provides, of course, is the operative question. Indeed,
sometimes even very good science will not demonstrably
improve the accuracy of individual decision-making, though it
might nonetheless be relevant and admissible because it
provides the triers of fact with contextual information that will
help them understand other evidence in the case.
A.

When General Science Is Determinative in Particular
Cases

In practice, the law is interested not simply in whether
a particular variable causes a particular effect, but, ultimately,
in whether a particular variable did cause the effect.10 Scientific
research will sometimes identify a single unidirectional
relationship between two variables. In medicine, the term
pathognomonic refers to a diagnostic version of this insight. A
10

This analysis simplifies matters considerably, since both the existence and
extent of the cause, as well as the existence and extent of the effect, may be disputed in
a particular case.
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symptom is pathognomonic when it is “decisively characteristic
of a disease.”11 For example, “Koplik’s spots . . . are
pathognomonic of measles.”12 The strongest version of a pathspecific relationship would be the unusual situation where a
cause and an effect are uniquely associated, such that the
cause always produces the effect and the effect is always
attributable to the cause. Outside of basic physics and
chemistry, however, the strongest version of path-specificity
will be quite rare. Nonetheless, such relationships are possible.
This strong version could be termed cause/effect pathspecificity because the cause and the effect are uniquely tied to
one another.
The law is also interested in weaker versions of pathspecificity. For instance, a particular cause might always
produce a particular effect, but other causes might produce
similar effects. This could be termed causal path-specificity
because the cause always produces a single effect, but other
causes might produce the same effect. An example of this might
be a lesion in a specific part of the brain that produces auditory
hallucinations. Anyone with such a lesion would suffer from
auditory hallucinations, but not all people with auditory
hallucinations have a lesion in that region of the brain.
Conversely, a particular effect might always be produced by a
particular cause, but the cause does not invariably produce the
effect. This could be termed effect path-specificity because the
effect has a single cause, but the cause does not have a single
effect. An example of this is the relationship between asbestos
exposure and mesothelioma. The unique cause of mesothelioma
is exposure to asbestos, but not everyone exposed to asbestos
develops mesothelioma.13
In legal proceedings, the strength and nature of pathspecificity is likely to be important. In general, cause/effect
path-specificity will be the most probative kind of scientific
evidence available. In contrast, the probative power of causal
path-specificity or effect path-specificity will depend on the
substantive law of the case. For example, in many criminal
11

Mondofacto Online Medical Dictionary, Pathognomonic, http://www.
mondofacto.com/facts/dictionary?pathognomonic (last visited Jan. 16, 2010).
12
MedicineNet, Definition of Pathognomonic, http://www.medterms.com/
script/main/art.asp?articlekey=6386 (last visited Feb. 10, 2008).
13
Asbestos also causes other ailments, including lung cancer. See Piero
Mustacchi, Lung Cancer Latency and Asbestos Liability, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 277, 280
(1996). But, as mentioned, some people who are exposed to asbestos never get sick from
it.
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cases, the issue will be whether the defendant suffered the
relevant effect, and it will not matter greatly that a variety of
causes can produce it. In such cases, scientific evidence of
causal path-specificity would strongly support the defendant’s
case. This would be so in an insanity case in which evidence
that the defendant has a brain lesion that invariably produces
auditory hallucinations would be highly probative, despite the
fact that other factors might cause the same symptoms.
Conversely, in many civil cases, effect path-specificity will be
the more probative kind of evidence. In the example of
mesothelioma, a civil plaintiff who has this disease will be able
to trace it back to asbestos exposure. In many civil cases, a
substantial obstacle to a plaintiff’s recovery is showing that the
effect he or she suffers from is attributable to the cause
associated with the defendant. Effect path-specificity solves
this difficulty. If the defendant was responsible for the
plaintiff’s asbestos exposure, then the plaintiff’s mesothelioma
is attributable to the defendant.
B.

When General Science Is Probative, but Not
Determinative, in Particular Cases

In most applied science contexts, path-specificity is not
possible, either because it does not exist in actuality or because
scientists’ methods are unable to identify those cases in which
it does exist. In most areas of interest to the law, scientific
research provides knowledge about cause and effect
relationships generally, but will be only more or less
determinate on the question of whether a specific instance of
an effect is attributable to a specific cause, or that a specific
cause contributed to a particular effect. In this vast domain,
applied scientific research comes in myriad forms and its value
for deciding individual cases varies greatly. In some situations,
the science will be nearly definitive regarding a specific cause
and effect relation and in others it will do little more than
increase the likelihood that a relevant relationship exists
slightly above chance.
As is true with the concept of path-specificity discussed
in the previous section, indeterminate scientific research might
be relevant in legal proceedings in three separately identifiable
ways, regarding (1) effect only, because the cause is known (or
can be assumed), (2) cause only, because the effect is known (or
can be assumed), or (3) both cause and effect. As will become
clear in the discussion that follows, the intended purpose for
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which the science is to be used is associated with the demands
that courts place on the science itself.
In many legal contexts, only the effect is relevant
because the causal variable is fairly known or is assumed.
Indeed, one of the best known subjects in law and psychology
fits this category: eyewitness identification. In eyewitness
identification research, researchers have found that certain
factors interfere with accuracy, such as presence of a weapon,
cross-race identifications, and use of leading questions by
interviewers.14 In this example, the causal side of the equation
is the independent variable, which is more or less known or
assumed to be present in the case. The focus, therefore, is
principally on what effect this causal variable has had. Hence,
if the witness is white and the perpetrator is black, the
empirical crux of the matter concerns what effect this causal
variable has on the accuracy of the identification. Other
examples in which the effects are relevant and the cause is
known or assumed include the effects of hypnosis on memory,15
the impact of putatively prejudicial photographs or images on
fact finders’ judgments,16 and the effect of violent television on
viewers.17
In effect-relevant cases—that is, where the cause is
known or assumed and the effects have been the subject of
research—the science is rarely employed to do more than
provide general insights about those who have experienced the
causal variable of interest. It may very well be, for instance,
that when a gun is present, eyewitness identifications are on
average less accurate than when one is not; but this finding
provides very little information regarding whether any
particular identification is accurate. In the law, general
research findings might very well be relevant and admissible to
inform the jury of factors that might interfere with a witness’s
accurate recall, which the jury could use or ignore as it deemed

14

See Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification: Scientific Status, in 2
MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY, supra
note 7, at 520, 534-47 (Faigman et al. eds., 2009).
15
See Michael Nash & Robert Nadon, Hypnosis: Scientific Status, in 2
MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY, supra
note 7, at 733.
16
David A. Bright & Jane Goodman-Delahunty, Gruesome Evidence and
Emotion: Anger, Blame, and Jury Decision-Making, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 183 (2006).
17
Kevin D. Browne & Catherine Hamilton-Giachritsis, The Influence of
Violent Media on Children and Adolescents: A Public-Health Approach, 365 LANCET
702, 702 (2005).
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fit. The science in this case, however, says very little about
eyewitness identification.
The second category, and one that arises often in court,
is when the effect is fairly known (or can be assumed), and the
science is offered to demonstrate the cause of that effect. Whole
areas of medical and psychological causation fit this category,
as do some areas of forensic science. In medical causation, a
plaintiff might be known to have leukemia (i.e., the effect) and
the scientifically controverted issue will be whether one
variable (e.g., trichloroethylene) or another caused the illness.
In psychological causation, the same analysis applies. For
example, a witness who suffers from Post-traumatic Stress
Disorder (PTSD) might claim that it was caused by a sexual
assault rather than other causes, such as a failed marriage and
a lost job. Finally, some areas of forensic science fit this causerelevant category. The best example is arson investigation. In
the ordinary arson case, the effect is known (i.e., a burned or
exploded structure), but the science is offered to demonstrate
the cause (e.g., purposely set using some incendiary device or
material).
When the proffered science is relevant to the cause of
some known effect, it is ultimately meant to operate
diagnostically in regard to the individual case at hand. This
category presents the most classic manifestation of the
challenges associated with reasoning from group data to
decisions in individual cases. In many areas, the research
provides substantial evidence of a general connection between
variables, but the science does not pave a direct path to
extrapolating from the general data to the individual case.
Ordinarily, some additional method is used to bring the general
science to the individual case, usually labeled vaguely as
“differential diagnosis” or “differential etiology.”18 This issue is
considered in Part II, infra.
The third and final category of scientific relevance is
something of a catch-all, and involves those cases in which the
science informs both the causal and the effect sides of the
equation. In other words, in this category the situation or
context is argued to have legal significance, but the science is
necessary to show how or why this is so. Many psychological
claims fall into this category, as do most of the forensic
identification technologies. A good example of the former is
18

See generally FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 27-49.
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research on predictions of violence. The matter of predicting
violence has wide significance in the law, and scientists have
sought to provide guidance on this issue by relating one set of
variables (i.e., predictors) to another variable (i.e., future
violence). Neither the “cause” nor the “effect” is known outside
of the applicable research. Most forensic identification
technologies operate similarly. Scientific research on DNA
profiling, for instance, describes both the existence of the
phenomenon as well as the significance of that phenomenon for
legal decision-making. Significantly, both actuarial predictions
of violence and DNA profiling are framed generally, and, to the
extent that they are applied to individual cases, the proffered
opinions ordinarily remain in their general population-based
form.19
In the end, law and science are separate disciplines and,
though they often share goals or objectives, neither is nor
should be expected to be the other’s handmaiden. It is hardly
surprising, therefore, that the methods of science do not
correspond neatly to the needs of the law. Yet, nonetheless, at
least in a preliminary way, it is possible to identify general
pathways of scientific investigation and consider how they
sometimes might, but oftentimes do not, provide the answers to
the questions the law poses. Understanding the parameters of
the scientific enterprise, however, is only the first step in
improving the law’s use of research data. Much of the
information the law needs from science does not fit neatly into
conventional modes of empirical inquiry. Whereas scientists
ordinarily study causes and effects in populations, courts
ordinarily need to determine causes and effects in particular
individuals. The next section examines the difficulties endemic
to developing a rigorous individual-based empiricism.

19

See Helena Kraemer et al., Coming to Terms With the Terms of Risk, 54
ARCHIVE GEN. PSYCHIATRY 337, 340 (1997). It should be noted that very often
predictions of violence opinions are not based on scientific research at all. Many, if not
most opinions offered in court on this subject, are based on clinical judgment, and they
are presented accordingly as conclusions about a particular person. On the value of
clinical versus actuarial predictions of violence, see Stefania Aegisdottir, The MetaAnalysis of Clinical Judgment Project: Fifty-Six Years of Accumulated Research on
Clinical Versus Actuarial Predictions of Violence, 34 COUNSELING PSYCHOLOGIST 400
(2006).
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FRAMING EMPIRICAL QUESTIONS IN THE COURTROOM

The basic perspective of most courtroom proceedings is
individual and specific. Courts look to answer such questions
as whether the defendant killed the victim, the plaintiff’s
leukemia was caused by a chemical produced by the defendant,
the juvenile defendant is competent to be tried as an adult, the
capital defendant is likely to be violent if not executed, and so
forth. While the ultimate issue in most legal proceedings
involves the determination of a particular fact (or facts), courts
well understand that underlying these specific questions is
knowledge about the general world. Hence, a defendant’s guilt
might depend on the general match probabilities of DNA
evidence, and a plaintiff’s civil claim against a chemical
manufacturer might depend partly on epidemiological studies
showing an association between the alleged offending chemical
and leukemia. Tackling the complex challenge of integrating
scientific research into legal decision-making would be helped
considerably if there were a vocabulary that permitted
categorization of the different ways science might be relevant
to legal decision-making. There has been no shortage of
attempts at providing such a taxonomy.20
A.

Taxonomies of Fact-Finding

The first, and still most influential, taxonomy of factfinding in law was offered by Professor Kenneth Culp Davis.21
Davis distinguished between what he termed legislative facts
and adjudicative facts. Legislative facts are those facts that
transcend the particular dispute and are relevant to legal
reasoning and the fashioning of legal rules.22 Adjudicative facts,
in contrast, are those facts particular to the dispute.23
In a series of influential articles in the 1980s, Professors
John Monahan and Laurens Walker refined Davis’ dichotomy
in a manner that more fully captures the ways that science is
20

I too have participated in this endeavor, though my efforts were restricted
to constitutional cases. See DAVID L. FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED
THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS 43-62 (2008).
21
Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the
Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402-03 (1942).
22
Id. at 402; see also Fed. R. Evid. 201(a), Advisory Committee’s Note
(“Legislative facts . . . are those which have relevance to legal reasoning and the
lawmaking process, whether in the formulation of a legal principle or ruling by a judge
or court or in the enactment of a legislative body.”).
23
Davis, supra note 21, at 402.
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used in the courtroom.24 Their primary focus was on the law’s
use of social science. They identified three levels of convergence
between social science and law: social authority, social facts,
and social frameworks. Social authority refers to social science
research relevant to the determination of legislative facts and
thus the formulation of legal rules.25 According to their
proposal, social authority is analogous to legal authority and
should be consulted similarly. Hence, judges would consider
social science “precedent” (i.e., past research) as presented
through briefs, arguments, and sua sponte.26 The information
found to be relevant and valid would then be incorporated into
the judge’s conclusions of law. Alternatively, in the MonahanWalker model, social science research might be relevant to
adjudicative facts (what they call “social facts”), in which case,
after being deemed admissible, it would be presented to the
trier of fact through expert testimony.27 Finally, social science
research might have relevance as a combination of social
authority and adjudicative fact. Professors Monahan and
Walker label this use “social frameworks,” where some issue in
the particular dispute is claimed to be an instance of a social
scientific finding or theory of general import.28
The Monahan-Walker model, though framed to deal
with their subject of interest (social science), nicely captures
the three basic divisions of fact-finding that courts must
process. Most importantly, their social framework category is a
significant leap forward in clarifying the challenges associated
with integrating empirical research into legal decision-making.
Indeed, arguably the social authority (i.e., legislative facts) and
social facts (i.e., adjudicative facts) are merely components of
24

John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining,
Evaluating and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (1986)
[hereinafter Monahan & Walker (1986)]; Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social
Facts: Scientific Methodology as Legal Precedent, 76 CAL. L. REV. 877 (1988)
[hereinafter Walker & Monahan (1988)]; Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social
Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559 (1987)
[hereinafter Walker & Monahan (1987)].
25
Walker & Monahan (1987), supra note 24, at 562.
26
Monahan & Walker (1986), supra note 24, at 490-91.
27
Walker & Monahan (1988), supra note 24, at 887.
28
Walker & Monahan (1987), supra note 24, at 563-67. According to
Monahan and Walker’s social framework model, the judge would consider and instruct
the jury on the accuracy of the general claim, but the jury would also hear expert
testimony on how the research applies to the case before it. Id. at 592. In traditional
practice, however, the jury is the fact finder for both components of social framework
evidence. For present purposes, I need not choose which procedural approach is the
better one.

2010]

EVIDENTIARY INCOMMENSURABILITY

1127

social frameworks, with the latter two being defined as a
function of the legal use for evidence, not its scientific nature.
In other words, all empirical research is conceivable in terms of
frameworks, because it invariably has both a general
component and a specific component. Whether the general
component is legally relevant at all and, if so, what it is
relevant to prove, dictates in the Monahan-Walker model
whether it is a “social authority” or “social framework.” For
example, consider the empirical question of the developmental
competence of sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds. In the context
of capital punishment, this general fact was used in Roper v.
Simmons29 to support the conclusion that applying the death
penalty to those who killed before reaching the age of majority
was unconstitutional. As such, this legislative fact was
informed by “social authority.” On the other hand, if the
question was whether a particular sixteen- or seventeen-yearold had competently waived his Miranda rights, the research
used in Roper would be employed to inform a “social
framework.”30 In the case involving the waiving of Miranda
rights, the court would have to apply the framework to the
individual case, thus paradigmatically using both components
of Monahan and Walker’s social framework category.
B.

Empirical Frameworks

For
the
purpose
of
examining
evidentiary
incommensurability between law and science, the Monahan
and Walker concept of social frameworks is all that is
specifically needed. It fully captures the juxtaposition of the
inordinate empirical difficulties surrounding the use of group
data to make individual decisions, and the law’s frequent need
to do just that. Since the phenomenon of interest extends well
beyond social science, and includes all applied science with
policy implications, the term “empirical framework” is more
accurate and will be used here. The following sections,
therefore, consider the legal demands on empirical research,
from both the more conciliatory use of general research data to
answer general legal propositions, to the more demanding use
of general data to reach individualized judgments.

29

543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005).
See, e.g., Thomas Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights:
An Empirical Analysis, 68 CAL. L. REV. 1134 (1980).
30
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Defining the “Frame”

Because ordinary science operates at the general level of
descriptive and inferential statistics, it can be readily employed
to determine general propositions. Consider, for example, a
hypothesis that has been the subject of several legal cases:
violent video games cause minors who play them to be violent
and asocial. This hypothesis has been studied in a multitude of
ways, including observational case studies, correlational
studies, laboratory experiments, brain imaging, and so forth.31
If these differing methods point in the same direction, then
some general conclusions might be made regarding the
relationship between violent video games and violence among
children. If they point in different directions, of course, the task
is complicated greatly, if not made impossible, until more
research is done. But even when the body of research is robust,
conclusions are likely to be tentative and, at best, described in
probabilistic terms.
The legal relevance of the science, however uncertainly
known, depends on the substantive law of the case. In regard to
the violent video game example, then, this hypothesis might be
relevant as a general proposition—e.g., do violent video games
lead to increased violence among children—or as that research
might apply in a particular case—e.g., was the minordefendant’s violent action attributable to having played violent
video games.
In the law, most litigation tends to involve the
application of general principles to a specific case. Frequently,
however, a general proposition of science is itself at issue. A
good example of this, coming from the violence in media
example, is the case Entertainment Software Association v.
Blagojevich.32 In Entertainment Software, several video
industry trade associations sued the State to enjoin the
enforcement of two statutes that regulated the content of
violent and sexually explicit videos. The plaintiffs argued that
the State’s laws violated the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment. The district court agreed that the laws implicated
First Amendment rights and held that the legislation could
survive only if the State had a compelling interest that would
be substantially achieved by the laws. The court found that
31

See generally Craig A. Anderson, An Update on the Effects of Playing
Violent Video Games, 27 J. ADOLESCENCE 113 (2004) (reviewing the literature).
32
404 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1059 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
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“[t]he Illinois General Assembly’s main justifications . . . were
three legislative findings about the effect of playing video
games
on
minors’
physiological
and
neurological
development.”33 According to the court, the legislature believed
that playing violent video games makes children (1) “exhibit
violent, asocial, or aggressive behavior”; (2) “[e]xperience
feelings of aggression”; and (3) “[e]xperience a reduction of
activity in the frontal lobes of the brain which is responsible for
controlling behavior.”34 In concluding that Illinois had not met
its considerable burden, the court extensively reviewed
psychological and neurological research that had been
advanced by the State. The court explained that the State
“failed to present substantial evidence showing that playing
violent video games causes minors to have aggressive feelings
or engage in aggressive behavior.”35 Moreover, the court stated
that “there is barely any evidence at all, let alone substantial
evidence, showing that playing violent video games causes
minors to ‘experience a reduction of activity in the frontal lobes
of the brain which is responsible for controlling behavior.’”36
The court permanently enjoined the Illinois law.
The second hypothesis, that a particular minor’s violent
action is attributable to having played violent video games, is
the more typical courtroom situation in regard to scientific
evidence. In these cases, both the general hypothesis and the
specific hypothesis are at issue. Although the defense is
unusual, defendants have on occasion argued insanity on the
basis of video programming.37 In Zamora v. State,38 for example,
“Zamora’s insanity defense was based upon ‘involuntary
subliminal television intoxication.’” In particular, defense
counsel argued that violent television had a noxious influence
on sociopathic children and that Zamora had killed as a
consequence of this effect.39 To support this theory, the defense
33

Id. at 1073.
Id.
35
Id. at 1074 (The court added that, “[a]t most, researchers have been able to
show a correlation between playing violent video games and a slightly increased level
of aggressive thoughts and behavior.”).
36
Id.
37
See generally Jonathan Chananie, Violent Videogames, Crime, and the
Law: Looking for Proof of a Causal Connection, 26 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L. 27, 43
(2007) (listing cases); Patricia J. Falk, Novel Theories of Criminal Defense Based upon
the Toxicity of the Social Environment: Urban Psychosis, Television Intoxication, and
Black Rage, 74 N.C. L. REV. 731 (1996) (same).
38
361 So. 2d 776, 779 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
39
Id.
34
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offered two experts. The first, a psychologist, offered to testify
to the effect of television on adolescents generally.40 A second
expert, a psychiatrist, testified that the defendant “did not
know right from wrong” when he “fired the fatal shot,” thus
applying the general theory of the case to the particular
defendant. The court excluded the psychologist on the ground
that she could not speak to Zamora’s individual case. The
psychiatrist testified at trial, but apparently to little effect,
since Zamora was convicted.
In the courtroom, research on general propositions, such
as whether violent media causes an increase in violence among
children, addresses a threshold question and one which
scientists are trained to address. In an insanity defense to
murder, however, the question is whether the particular
person’s violence was caused by exposure to violent media. This
issue of specific application poses a complex and difficult
cognitive exercise. Moreover, it is an exercise that varies in
different empirical contexts. It is also a subject that has been
substantially ignored by scientists interested in the courtroom
use of their data.
D.

Reasoning to the Specific

Although the challenge of reasoning from general
research data to individual cases has been considered in a
fairly cursory manner by courts and legal scholars, the basic
challenges are fairly easily summarized. This is especially so in
the conventional toxic tort litigation context, the area in which
courts have most often considered it. In a nutshell, the first
task is to demonstrate that the substance could have caused
the ailment (i.e., the validity of the general proposition); the
second task is to show both that it probably did, and that other
substances probably did not, cause the plaintiff’s condition.
The simplest case of this reasoning process might
involve general research that indicates that some substance
causes an ailment that is uniquely associated with that
substance. For instance, as noted in Part I, asbestos has been
shown to cause mesothelioma and it is the only substance
known to cause it.41 Since mesothelioma is a “signature
disease,” the only question concerns the circumstances of the
40

Id.
Victor Roggli, Asbestos: Scientific Status, in 3 MODERN SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY, supra note 7, at § 26.
41
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individual’s exposure to asbestos (i.e., was the defendant
responsible), not whether exposure caused the condition. The
cause and effect path-specificity operates in this example to
permit straightforward logical deductions from the general
data to individual cases. This is rare in toxic tort litigation. For
example, in contrast to asbestos, while second-hand smoke has
been linked to lung cancer, many other substances are known
to cause lung cancer. Hence, in regard to identifying the cause
of a person’s lung cancer, an expert must not only rule-in
smoking as a possible cause, but also rule-out other possible
causes.42
The principal tool used to move from general research
findings to statements about individual cases is “differential
etiology,” sometimes misleadingly referred to as “differential
diagnosis.” Properly understood, differential diagnosis refers to
the identification of the illness or behavioral condition that a
person is experiencing. Differential etiology refers to the cause
or causes of that condition. Hence, the determination that a
person suffers from “dissociative amnesia” and not “dissociative
fugue” is a diagnostic issue.43 The determination that a sexual
assault at age ten caused the diagnosed dissociative amnesia,
and that it did not result from a medical condition or physical
trauma, is an etiological matter. Very different skill sets are
usually involved in these two determinations. Indeed, the DSM
explicitly eschews any claim of the etiological verity of its
diagnostic categories.44 It is worth emphasizing, as well, that
the validity of the diagnosis of dissociative amnesia is a matter
of general research. The entire process of differential diagnosis
and differential etiology assumes that the designated category
has adequate empirical support in the first place as a general
proposition. Hence, although it is logically obvious, it should be
stated plainly that an expert should never be permitted to
testify about a specific application of a general proposition if
research does not adequately support the general proposition.
In the professional practice of both clinical medicine and
clinical psychology, the primary concern is diagnosis and not
etiology. An oncologist might be curious about what caused his
or her patient’s leukemia, but the doctor’s first task is to
42

Faigman et al., Tobacco: Legal Issues, in 3 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE:
THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY, supra note 7.
43
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS §§ 300.12-.13 (4th ed., text revision 2000).
44
Id. at xxxvii.

1132

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:4

diagnose and treat the condition, not determine whether it was
caused by trichloroethylene, benzene, electromagnetic fields, or
something else. Similarly, a psychologist treating a person
thought to suffer from either Post-traumatic Stress Disorder
(PTSD) or adjustment disorder is primarily concerned with
identifying and treating the condition, not determining the true
causes of that condition. In the ordinary practice of clinical
medicine and clinical psychology, treatment and therapy are
the principal objectives, not assessing cause. A person
presenting symptoms associated with PTSD, therefore, may
claim that the traumatic event was a sexual assault committed
by her uncle. From the therapeutic standpoint, at least at the
start, the important factor is that there was a traumatic event.
Whether the patient’s uncle was the cause need not be
specifically resolved for diagnostic purposes. In the law, of
course, who caused the traumatic event is the crux of the
matter. Hence, the core nature of much clinical practice is at
right angles to the crux of most legal inquiries.
In the courtroom, differential etiology is the operative
issue. Moreover, the same basic principle is implicated,
whether the expert opinion comes from research-based science
or clinical practice (i.e., “experience”). Indeed, at least
superficially, the former suffers a comparative disadvantage,
since the research tradition does not ordinarily purport to offer
conclusive statements about individual cases. Research, for
example, might identify factors highly associated with false
confessions, but these general propositions are some distance
from what is needed to allow experts to opine regarding the
truth or falsity of any particular confession. Clinicians at least
have a history of applying general knowledge to individual
cases, though, as noted, while this practice might be well
accepted for therapeutic purposes, its validity for forensic ends
is somewhat doubtful. Whether researchers or clinicians have
the wherewithal to help triers of fact in applying general
research propositions to specific cases is a threshold legal
matter that should depend on the reliability and validity of the
differential etiology done in the respective case. It may be, that
is, that in vast areas of clinical practice there is no general
research foundation in the first instance. And, as stated above,
if research does not support a general proposition—say, the
phenomenon of repressed memories—then clinical expert
testimony that a particular person has repressed certain
memories of early sexual abuse cannot be sustained.
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Differential Etiology

Differential etiology is a reasoning process that involves
a multitude of factors, few of which are easily quantified. An
expert offering an opinion regarding a specific case must first
consider the strength of the evidence for the general
proposition being applied in the case. If the claim is that
substance X caused plaintiff’s condition Y, the initial inquiry
must concern the strength of the relationship between X and Y
as a general proposition. For example, both second-hand smoke
and first-hand smoke are associated with lung cancer, but the
strength of the relationship generally is much stronger for the
latter than it is for the former. The inquiry regarding strength
of relationship will depend on many factors, including, among
other things, the statistical strength of any claims and the
quality of the methods used in the research. Additionally, the
general model must consider the strength of the evidence for
alternative possible causes of Y and the strength of their
respective relationships (and possibly interactions with other
factors). Again, the quality of the research and the different
methodologies employed will make comparisons difficult.
Complicating matters further regarding identification of
potential causes of condition Y are the myriad of possible
causes that have not been studied, or have been studied
inadequately.45 Hence, determining the contours of the general
model is a dicey affair in itself, since it requires combining
disparate research results and discounting those results by an
unknown factor associated with additional variables not yet
studied. And this is just the first part of the necessary analysis
if the expert wants to give an opinion about an individual case.
The second part of the analysis—specific application of
general propositions that are themselves supported by
adequate research—requires two abilities, neither of which are
clearly within most scientists’ skill sets. The first, and perhaps
less problematic, is that of forensic investigator. Almost no
matter what the empirical relationship, whether medical or
psychological, exposure or dosage levels will be relevant to the
diagnosis. The first principle of toxicology is that “the dose
45

In Henricksen v. Conocophilips Co., 605 F. Supp. 2d 1142 (E.D. Wash.
2009), the court observed that eighty to ninety percent of the causes of acute
myelogenous leukemia (AML) were unknown (“ideopathic”). Id. at 1149. The court
stated that “[i]f 90 percent of the causes of a disease are unknown, it is impossible to
eliminate an unknown disease as the efficient cause of a patient’s illness.” Id. at 1162
(quoting Whiting v. Boston Edison Co., 891 F. Supp. 12, 21 n.41 (D. Mass. 1995)).
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makes the poison,” since any substance in sufficient quantities
could injure or kill someone.46 Similarly, in a wide variety of
psychological contexts, the exposure or dose will be the poison.
For instance, degree of trauma affects diagnostic categorization
between PTSD and adjustment disorder, level of anxiety affects
eyewitness identifications, amount of lack of sleep affects false
confession rates, and so on. The expert testifying to specific
causation must determine exposure and dosage levels for the
suspected cause (i.e., the source suspected by the client) as well
as for all other known or possible causes. This task is difficult
enough alone, but is enormously complicated by the significant
potential for recall bias, given that the litigation will be
profoundly affected by what is recalled.
The second skill set that is needed has not yet been
invented or even described with precision. Somehow, the
diagnostician must combine the surfeit of information
concerning the multitude of factors that make up the general
model, combine it with the case history information known or
suspected about the individual, and offer an opinion with some
level of confidence that substance or experience X was the
likely cause of condition Y. In practice, this opinion is usually
stated as follows: “Within a reasonable degree of
medical/psychological certainty, it is my opinion that X caused
[a particular case of] Y.” This expression has no empirical
meaning and is simply a mantra repeated by experts for
purposes of legal decision makers who similarly have no idea
what it means. But even less extreme versions of this
statement—such as, “It is more likely than not true that this
case is an instance of some general phenomenon”—are
objectionable. Just how, for instance, would an eyewitness
researcher determine that a witness was more likely than not
inaccurate when the witness made a cross-racial identification
of the defendant after seeing the unarmed perpetrator for five
minutes under a streetlight from an unobstructed view twenty
feet away from the crime? There are no data that would
support psychologists’ ability to make such statements,
however modest or innocuous they may appear. Experts’ casespecific conclusions appear to be based largely on an admixture
of an unknown combination of knowledge of the subject,

46

Bernbard D. Goldstein & Russellyn Carruth, Toxicology: Scientific Status,
in 3 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY,
supra note 7, at § 22.
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experience over the years, commitment to the client or cause,
intuition, and blind-faith. Science it is not.
Whether, and in what way, particular scientific findings
are relevant to legal decision-making depends on the
substantive law of the case. Frequently, the relevant factual
issue under applicable law involves general propositions, ones
that population-based research corresponds to directly. Much
more often, however, the empirical focus of the ultimate legal
issue is on the particular case. But conventional scientific
methods do not share this focus. Although research data might
demonstrate with high confidence that a particular variable
has an effect of interest, it typically cannot demonstrate with
the same confidence that the particular variable had the effect
of interest in a particular case. Reconciling this evidentiary
incommensurability between what science ordinarily does and
what the law ordinarily needs is, as yet, one of the great unmet
challenges at the intersection of science and the law.
CONCLUSION
Most evidentiary codes require that expert testimony
“assist the trier of fact” in order for it to be admissible.47
Scientific expert testimony, however, must be legally relevant
and have evidentiary reliability (i.e., scientific validity).48
Moreover, expert opinion must offer insights beyond what
triers of fact could do on their own. Put another way, scientistexperts are limited to testifying about what their respective
field’s research can validly add to fact-finders’ deliberations—
and nothing more. This injunction, however, is not always
followed. In particular, experts frequently seek to comment not
simply on the import of general research findings, but on
whether a particular case fits those findings. Scientific
research that permits a valid description of a general
phenomenon, however, does not invariably give experts the
capacity to validly determine whether an individual case is an
instance of that general phenomenon.
A basic difference in perspective between science and
the law is that science studies individuals in order to make
statements about populations, while the law studies
populations in order to make statements about individuals. It

47
48

FED. R. OF EVID. 702.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993).
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does not necessarily follow that a scientist who can validly
describe a general phenomenon also has the wherewithal to say
whether an individual case is an instance of that general
phenomenon. In many respects, the matter of translating
scientific research findings into helpful information for factfinders in court should be a subject of first concern for applied
science. Yet this issue has been largely ignored by scientists.
This essay calls for a broadly conceived collaborative effort to
consider this basic issue, one that is endemic to the intersection
of law and science.

